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Discussant's Response to "Litigation Risk 
Broadly Considered" 
Lawrence A. Ponemon* 
State University of  New York at Binghamton 
The paper presented by Jerry Sullivan [1992] provides a thought-provoking 
essay dealing with the ever-increasing occurrence of  litigation risk in the audit-
ing profession  in the United States. The author provides some preliminary evi-
dence on the nature and extent of  alleged audit failures  gathered from  peer 
reviews of  SEC Practice Section (SECPS) member firms  over a three year pe-
riod and 90 QCIC cases reviewed by the Public Oversight Board (POB). His 
findings  imply that the recent wave of  alleged audit malpractice, especially law-
suits against Big Six firms,  may not be caused by substandard audit work. 
Rather, Sullivan intimates that much of  the present-day litigation alleging audit 
failure  may be baseless and without merit. Despite judicial reality, innocent 
firms  may choose to make out-of-court  settlements to avoid the high cost of  a 
proper litigation defense  and the peril of  punitive damages as, for  example, 
experienced by Coopers and Lybrand in the MiniScribe case [see The  Wall 
Street  Journal,  February 18, 1992, p. C-11]. 
As posited by the author, a direct consequence of  increasing litigation cost is 
a commensurate reduction in the profession's  reputation and ability to provide 
quality independent audits of  client companies. Given recent negative economic 
events in the United States caused, in part, by recessions in global financial 
markets and the crisis in the national Savings and Loan industry, the public's 
positive perception of  the independent auditing profession  may be dwindling. 
This, in turn, could lead to clients and financial  statement users alike placing 
less faith  in audit opinions and placing greater reliance on legal or contractual 
arrangements. As the demand for  public accounting services declines, govern-
ment authorities may become more actively involved in the regulation of  the 
profession.  Loss of  the public trust and resulting governmental interventions can 
cause the demise of  the public accounting profession. 
Admittedly, it is difficult  to engage in an intellectual debate when you agree 
with the fundamental  arguments raised by your opponent. My discussion, how-
ever, will attempt to provide a critical analysis of  Sullivan's contentions as well 
as a reinterpretation of  his results. The remainder of  my paper is organized into 
two parts. First I will comment on what I believe are the most salient aspects of 
the several excellent points raised by the author. In particular, I will touch upon 
* At Babson College at the time of  this presentation. The author acknowledges the many helpful 
comments provided by Abraham Akresh, Richard Mandel and Zoe-Vonna Palmrose, and appreci-
ates the editorial assistance provided by Joan Grossman. 
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the possibility of  abuses in the legal system, the importance of  self-regulatory 
controls in mitigating substandard audit work, and the significance  of  the find-
ings on peer review and QCIC investigations presented. Then I will provide a 
critique of  four  general claims made by the author, which are: 
• that the recent wave of  litigations against auditing firms  does not serve 
the public interest; 
• that auditors are generally victims of  a litigious society; 
• that the stringent process of  self-regulation  imposed on SEC Practice 
Section firms  of  the AICPA should reveal and ultimately weed out 
substandard work in the extant auditing domain; and 
• that SAS 59 going concern disclosures and the new COSO report 
requirements will exacerbate litigation risk for  auditors. 
An Emphasis of  Major Points 
Abuse in the Legal System 
As noted by Lawrence A. Weinbach, managing partner of  Arthur Andersen 
& Co., in a recent interview by The  Wall  Street  Journal  [September 1, 1992, p. 
B-8], "Out-of-court  settlements over malpractice litigation are costing the six 
biggest accounting firms  nine percent of  their audit fees."  Based on an estimate 
for  U.S. audit fees  of  the Big Six accounting firms,  the article further  suggests 
that annual litigation costs average about $56,000 per partner. To corroborate 
this point, consider the reluctance of  most major insurance companies to pro-
vide malpractice coverage to various professional  and occupational groups such 
as physicians, engineers, lawyers and accountants. While there may be instances 
of  egregious behavior in the auditing community, it would be absurd to believe 
that the present-day level of  contributory negligence or fraud  in the accounting 
profession  approached $56,000 per partner each year. What are the conse-
quences of  litigation assuming that this figure  is correct? Apropos the point 
raised by Sullivan, I too believe that the considerable sums paid by audit firms 
to defend  or settle malpractice lawsuits may provide evidence of  an abuse of 
legal process that, if  allowed to continue, could severely cripple the accounting 
profession  as we know it today. 
Has society become too litigious? Some legal scholars and political experts 
believe it has, arguing that the significant  rise in practicing attorneys within the 
United States over the past two decades has resulted in a commensurate 
increase in the number of  lawsuits filed  against individuals and business firms. 
Walter Olson [1991], in his recent book entitled The  Litigation  Explosion,  notes 
that malpractice lawsuits have risen as much as 300-fold  in some sectors of  the 
economy in about twenty years. Quoting the results of  a Harvard Law School 
study, he further  suggests that only about one in five  malpractice claims have 
something to do with genuine negligence. This exponential increase in court-
room docket activity has severely limited the court's ability to deal effectively 
with and respond to a plethora of  civil malpractice cases. Legal experts now 
believe that chaos in the American courtroom is causing the legal system to 
become increasingly bureaucratic and grossly inefficient.  This fact,  coupled 
with the general difficulty  in defending  any malpractice action, may explain 
why it is becoming increasingly difficult  to dispose quickly of  lawsuits against 
public accounting firms  that are known to be frivolous  or without legal merit. 
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Importance of  Self-Regulatory  Controls 
In response to increasing litigation risk and the threat of  governmental inter-
vention, the public accounting profession  as well as individual firms  have insti-
tuted formal  control mechanisms to ensure audit quality. For example, audit 
firms  belonging to the AICPA undergo a peer review if  they provide attestation 
services to client organizations. A peer review is a detailed, independent in-
vestigation of  a public accounting firm,  including certain selected client engage-
ments, by an independent body of  accounting practitioners from  another quali-
fied  firm  or by a team of  experts assembled by a professional  body such as the 
AICPA. The purpose of  the review is to ensure that member firms  comply with 
the standards, rules and regulations required by the profession. 
The peer review is remedial rather than punitive. Very rarely does a peer 
review seek to uncover the unprofessional  or unethical actions of  an individual 
practitioner or an entire firm.  If,  however, in the course of  their investigation, a 
breach Of  the ethics code is revealed to members of  the review team, such a 
finding  could possibly result in a referral  to the ethics division of  the Institute. 
In certain cases, very negative findings  could lead to civil or criminal liability 
on the part of  the firm  under investigation. In actuality, this occurs only rarely 
and in most cases the firm  judged to be in noncompliance will receive a private 
reprimand by the review team and the AICPA. It is still asserted that the con-
sternation and embarrassment caused by a potentially negative peer review, in 
some situations, will motivate a firm  and its employees to comply with various 
professional  and technical standards. 
Comprehensive peer reviews are also performed  by a special investigation 
unit of  the AICPA when audit firms  are implicated in alleged audit failure.  As 
explained in a recently published monograph entitled Evolution of  the Quality 
Control Inquiry Committee by Mautz and Evers [1991], QCIC reviews are con-
ducted on SECPS member firms  to determine the nature and probable causes of 
the allegations contained in pending litigation. If  instances of  substandard audit 
work are discovered, the committee makes recommendations to the audit firm 
so that it can take the necessary steps to avoid similar problems on future 
engagements. 
The profession  also employs a detailed set of  work guidelines known as 
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) to ensure a consistent and rea-
sonable application of  professional  judgment. Although the exact nature of  audit 
judgment varies according to a multitude of  factors  including the auditor's com-
petence, integrity and ethical values, these standards serve as examples of  how 
one should behave in a wide variety of  situations and circumstances in the 
course of  professional  practice. 
In recognizing the possibility for  substandard work despite a detailed set of 
professional  standards, public accounting firms  have established an internal sys-
tem for  reviewing the quality of  all audit work completed by the firm  (e.g., in 
accordance with the AICPAs' Statement on Quality Control Standard No. 1 
entitled System  on Quality Control  for  a CPA firm).  Such control systems 
attempt to validate the reliability of  active attestation engagements within the 
firm  on an ongoing basis. These often  include a quality control review of  select-
ed workpapers to ensure the consistency and completeness of  all auditing work 
performed  and an internal examination of  post-audit adjusting entries recom-
mended by the audit team. In addition, when difficult  or ambiguous technical is-
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sues are encountered, firm  specialists are often  brought in to participate on an 
ex-post basis. 
Working in concert, peer reviews, detailed audit standards and internal con-
trols within the audit firm  tend to mitigate the possibility of  litigation risk 
caused by an auditor's erroneous judgment or unethical acts in practice. Some 
argue that the nature of  self-regulation  is corrective and, therefore,  it cannot pre-
vent egregious judgmental errors or audit failure  from  happening in the first 
place. Even with the best system of  total quality management, it may be diffi-
cult, if  not impossible, to identify  audit failure  soon after  it happens. As will be 
mentioned later, the chances for  detection are especially problematic when the 
unscrupulous auditor knows the detailed workings of  the quality control system 
used to prevent such action. Others, however, argue that the mere existence of 
quality controls discourages potential unethical behavior. While such controls 
are far  from  perfect,  I believe that they do act, to some extent, as a deterrent to 
audit failure  as well as unethical behavior in the accounting profession. 
Sullivan's Presented Findings 
As Executive Director of  the Public Oversight Board, Jerry Sullivan has 
access to internal statistics for  SEC Practice Section member firms  gathered 
from  peer reviews and QCIC investigations. These data clearly support the 
claim that the extent of  substandard audit work is a minuscule proportion of  the 
total activity evaluated by the Institute. In particular, peer reviews of  thousands 
of  audit engagements over a three year period (as reported in Table 1 of 
Sullivan's paper) revealed only thirty-seven instances of  substandard audit work 
that, according to AU section 561, could have resulted in material error to a 
client's financial  statements and a change to the auditor's opinion. Only one 
such incident pertained to the work of  a Big Six accounting firm. 
Sullivan provides additional data pertaining to ninety selected cases of 
alleged audit failure  reported to the QCIC during the period 1989 to 1991. 
Substantially all lawsuits dealt with client organizations that had experienced 
financial  distress or bankruptcy during or after  the class action period. The 
author uses this fact  to support his claim that litigation does not necessarily 
mean a "busted audit". Rather, by virtue of  a so-called "deep pocket" for  set-
tling alleged malpractice, he intimates that blame is often  cast onto the largest 
accounting firms.  Along these lines, Sullivan writes [1992, p. 55], 
The implication is that auditors' substandard performance  correlates to 
financial  difficulty  of  the entity being audited, i.e., the profession  can per-
form  well in profitable  and financially  successful  environments, but not so 
in financially  troubled environments. This is of  course a ludicrous propo-
sition, but is easily explained. The objective of  plaintiff's  lawyers litiga-
tion directed at auditors is settlement, not adjudication  of  the allegations 
[emphasis added], 
Sullivan [1992, p. 56] also points out the inconsistent application of  SAS 59 
audit report modifications  in the sample of  selected companies investigated by 
the QCIC, suggesting that going concern disclosures may be of  little benefit  to 
security holders for  forecasting  financial  distress or bankruptcy (e.g., poor hit 
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rates)1. Sullivan also found  that none of  the ninety cases of  alleged audit failure 
examined by the QCIC showed that the auditor failed  to identify  evidence relat-
ing to the allegation in the lawsuit—indicating that audit procedures for  the dis-
covery of  evidential matter must have been sufficiently  applied. In summary, 
the findings  presented by Sullivan provide some indication of  a potentially seri-
ous problem facing  the public accounting profession  in the United States, where 
allegations of  audit failure  and actual incidents of  poor quality audits may not 
be highly correlated. Although litigation reform  is probably warranted, my cri-
tique, as provided in the next section, is based on the premise that litigation can 
serve a useful  purpose in society. 
A Critique to Four General Claims 
Does Litigation Serve the Public Interest? 
To address this question, consider the framework  depicted in Figure 1, illus-
trating a relationship between actual audit quality (AAQ), perceived audit quali-
ty (PAQ) and litigation (LIT).2 As can be seen, using a Venn diagram, perceived 
audit quality and litigation are two mutually exclusive (disjoint) domains. 
Litigation risk, defined  as the intersection of  actual audit quality and litigation, 
is very small when perceived audit quality and actual audit quality nearly over-
lap. This is because, in an economic sense, the client and the auditing firm  enter 
into and realize an audit contract specifying  a given level at a given price. The 
domain of  litigation risk increases substantially when perceived audit quality 
does not equal actual audit quality because the client may believe that the audit 
firm  has shirked on its contractual obligation to the organization and its key 
stakeholders. Clearly, litigation risk becomes more salient as the gap between 
actual and perceived audit quality widens. 
Irrespective of  audit quality problems, however, litigation risk can be influ-
enced by a multitude of  other factors  defined  within a triad of  social, political 
and economic forces  that are determined by public demand. Factors that may be 
important include the nature of  self-regulation,  the level of  firm  profitability  and 
the proverbial expectations gap between users of  financial  statements and inde-
pendent auditors. The social-political-economic triad serves as a unique mecha-
nism for  ensuring audit quality and for  containing litigation problems within the 
boundary of  the public interest. In this regard, litigation has a dual role. First, it 
serves as a change agent through which the opinions of  the general public are 
communicated to the auditing profession.  Second, and perhaps most important-
ly, it acts as a deterrent to substandard auditing. Here, audit quality is defined  by 
the public's eye in the context of  what auditing ought to he. 
1 Prior research on the information  content of  audit opinions corroborate Sullivan's [1992] findings. 
Accordingly, studies show that less than 49 percent of  bankrupt companies received a going concern 
opinion one year prior to bankruptcy [Hopwood, McKeown and Mutchler, 1989, p.32]. In addition, 
Altman [1982] found,  for  an eight year period, that 25 percent of  companies receiving a going con-
cern opinion ultimately went bankrupt. It is important to note, however, that at the time of  these 
studies, auditors were not required to predict clients' ability to stay in business. 
2 Palmrose [1988] also proposes a causal relationship between a firm's  litigation activities and the 
audit quality perceived by the stakeholders of  a client organization. 
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FIGURE 1: AUDIT QUALITY AND LITIGATION RISK 
Public Interest 
Political Economic 
The apparently spurious association presented by Sullivan between substan-
dard audits and allegations of  audit failure  for  QCIC cases may have been 
brought about by a growing rift  between the public's belief  as to what auditing 
ought to be versus the reality of  what auditing is. Despite the severity of  eco-
nomic damages in recent years and the possible lack of  causality between audit 
and litigation risks, I hold the very unpopular view that malpractice litigation in 
auditing can and often  does serve a useful  role in society. 
To illustrate my point, consider the following  scenario. Suppose audit firms 
could predict with perfect  certainty the financial  condition of  a client company. 
Further, imagine that the firm  made all audit findings  publicly available to all 
interested parties. Would perfect  prediction and full  disclosure eliminate mal-
practice litigation in the profession?  I believe that the answer is yes. That is, 
aside from  the occasional harassment lawsuit, cases alleging audit failure  would 
invariably be avoided by plaintiff's  attorneys for  lack of  fee  potential or would 
be dismissed prior to trial. In this hypothetical situation, the value of  settlement 
and the cost of  defense  would be nominal. 
Assuming that the root cause of  litigation in any profession  is at least one 
dissatisfied  plaintiff,  perhaps the significant  rise in audit malpractice claims is 
due to the profession's  inability to understand and respond to the needs of  its 
constituency. For example, we may believe that by simply issuing the so-called 
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Soc i a l 
E x p e c t a t i o n Gap Firm P r o f i t a b i l i t y 
Increasing l i t igat ion risk 
Self Regulat ion 
expectation gap auditing standards (e.g., SAS 52 to SAS 61) we could virtually 
eliminate substantive performance  problems in auditing. In reality, however, 
these standards may have done little to change the perceptions of  financial  state-
ment users and other key exchange partners about the audit opinion or the client 
organization. Perhaps the only viable solution to reducing litigation risk is to 
substantially increase the scope of  audit services in ways that will provide 
greater comfort  to end-users of  financial  statement information.  This solution, 
however, has been ruled out by many on the basis that it would be too costly to 
provide higher levels of  assurance on auditing engagements. Taking this one 
step further,  perhaps the reduction in statistical sampling applications among 
Big Six firms,  as indicated by Sullivan, reflects  the belief  that cost is more im-
portant than quality. 
Are Auditors Culpable? 
Because public accounting is a legitimate profession,  to address the issue of 
culpability one needs to understand first  the role of  the legal system in profes-
sional self-regulation.  As a starting point, consider the early sociological litera-
ture, where theorists have attempted to categorize occupations as either profes-
sional or non-professional  based upon the presence of  several social or political 
attributes [Greenwood 1957; Montagna 1974; Wilensky 1964]. Sociologists 
generally agree that autonomy is perhaps the most significant  attribute that dis-
tinguishes professions  from  other occupations. Greenwood [1957], for  example, 
asserts that the only truly important distinction between professions  and other 
occupational groups is that the professional  possesses legitimate control over 
his or her work environment. The state grants autonomy, including the exclu-
sive right to determine who can legitimately do the work and how the work 
should be done. Professional  autonomy is not absolute, however, since the state 
has ultimate sovereignty. As Freidson [1971, p. 44] suggests, a profession  has 
within the state-protected environment sufficient  power to control virtually all 
facets  of  its work without serious interference  from  any lay group. Through a 
process of  political negotiation and persuasion, society is convinced that it is 
desirable to grant an occupation professional  stature. To be given autonomy, a 
profession  must demonstrate a high level of  specialized knowledge and skill, 
and, perhaps most importantly, trustworthiness. 
While professional  rules, standards and codes of  conduct may be important 
devices for  persuading the general public to believe that members of  a profes-
sion possess good qualities (e.g., competence and integrity), it does not guaran-
tee public support. As noted by Friedson [1971], standards of  conduct may be 
also viewed as manipulative because they attempt to influence  public opinion 
without directly affecting  behavior in the extant professional  domain. Although 
a profession  has the power of  self-determination,  it should recognize that auton-
omy is conditional, rather than absolute, since the public has ultimate sovereign-
ty. Consequently, if  a profession's  service, work product or behavior is not 
consistent with societal expectations, the public can reclaim its power in two 
ways: first,  by exercising political control and second, by seeking legal action. 
Society's mistrust of  political (governmental) forces  in the United States may 
explain, at least in part, the lawsuit craze over the past decade against various 
professional  groups, including accountants. 
Does the rash of  malpractice litigation mean that the auditing profession  has 
fallen  victim to the unreasonable demands of  society or does it mean that mem-
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bers of  the profession  have breached the public trust by engaging in nefarious 
business practices? Strong arguments can be made either way. As a starting 
point, consider the many egregious cases of  audit failure  arising from  the audi-
tors' participation in, or failure  to report incidents of  fraud  or fraudulent  finan-
cial reporting. On the other hand, there are many less publicized cases where 
auditors seemingly sacrificed  income potential and reputation by voluntarily 
disclosing incidents of  wrongdoing or fraud  within the client organization to the 
general public. 
There is another class of  malpractice stemming from  a shift  in standards of 
responsibility concerning due professional  care. For example, should the audi-
tors who failed  to acknowledge the possibility of  an understated loan loss 
reserve for  the first  financially  distressed Savings and Loan (S&L) be held to 
the same legal standard of  gross negligence as those who failed  to consider sim-
ilar audit evidence for  the 900th bankrupt S&L? All in all, I believe that the 
auditing profession  has experienced a soiled reputation caused, in part, by a rel-
atively small number of  egregious cases of  audit failure  that have been the basis 
for  many feature  stories in the press [Palmrose, 1991]. 
Does this mean that a few  bad apples are spoiling the barrel? Not according 
to four  studies on CPA audit quality conducted by the United States General 
Accounting Office  (GAO). Consider, for  example, a 1985 study in which the 
GAO reported that the federal  inspector general's office  found  one out of  four 
audit reports for  governmental units needing corrective action. To paraphrase 
the GAO (p. 2), in about one in five  audits ". . . the required audit work was not 
performed,  or the audit documentation was inadequate or unclear, after  review-
ing the auditors' working papers supporting the audit." In a 1986 study involv-
ing the audits of  governmental units requiring federal  assistance, the GAO 
found  that CPAs did not comply with governmental auditing standards in about 
thirty-four  percent of  the audits performed  by them. Over half  of  these audits 
involved a severe violation of  professional  standards. In 1988, the GAO studied 
the quality of  external audits completed for  participants in federal  guaranteed 
and insured loan programs. According to the GAO in their report (p. 3) ". . . 
seven of  twenty-eight loan program audits did not satisfactorily  comply with 
auditing standards. The problems included working papers that did not ade-
quately show the CPA appropriately tested financial  transactions, evaluated 
internal controls, or tested compliance with laws and regulations." More recent-
ly, the GAO conducted an investigation of  eleven out of  twenty-nine failed  sav-
ings and loan associations in the Dallas Federal Loan Bank District. In this 1989 
report, the GAO concluded that (p. 1) 
For six of  the eleven S&Ls, CPAs did not adequately audit and/or report 
the S&Ls' financial  or internal control problems in accordance with pro-
fessional  standards. The CPAs' problems involved (1) inadequate audit 
work in evaluating loan collectibility and (2) inadequate reporting on 
S&Ls' accounting practices, regulatory compliance, and internal controls. 
The nature of  the audit reporting problems was significant  enough to war-
rant referring  the CPA firms  performing  the audits to regulatory and pro-
fessional  bodies for  their review. 
In summary, drawing from  the findings  of  all four  GAO reports, I believe it 
is fair  to conclude that audit quality is far  from  perfect  — at least with respect to 
the audits of  governmental units, participants in federal  loan programs and sav-
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ings and loan associations. Taking these findings  one step further,  perhaps the 
low error rates found  by Sullivan in his review of  peer review and QCIC cases 
may not be representative of  the true state of  audit quality that exists in the 
accounting profession  today. 
Does Self-Regulation  work? 
According to Sullivan, the low occurrence of  substandard audit work found 
in his peer review data suggests that self-regulation  is working well. These same 
data, however, can be used to support an alternative claim; that is, the process of 
self-regulation  may be ineffective  at detecting audit failure.  This claim may be 
valid for  a variety of  reasons. First, poor audit quality is typically framed  as 
consensus to an existing body of  auditing standards rather than the auditor's 
ability to render the highest possible caliber of  auditing services. To clarify  this 
distinction, consider the now famous  opinion by U.S. Appellate Court Judge L. 
Hand in the T.J.  Hooper  (1932) decision in tort law. 
Indeed in most cases reasonable prudence is in fact  common prudence; 
but strictly it is never its measure; a whole calling may have unduly 
lagged in the adoption of  new and available devices. It never may set its 
own tests, however, persuasive be its usages. Courts  must in the end  say 
what is required;  there are precautions so imperative that even their uni-
versal disregard  will  not excuse their omission (emphasis added). 
Applying Judge Hand's reasoning to the arena of  auditors' legal liability, when 
assessing the quality of  audit work the peer review team should attempt to 
determine whether or not the audit firm  exercised a reasonable standard  of 
care, which may or may not be defined  by existing auditing standards or accept-
ed auditing practices. 
A second related problem concerns the reliability of  the peer review process 
itself.  For instance, firm-on-firm  reviews are commonly performed  among the 
largest public accounting firms  on a three year cycle. Given the small number of 
large firms  that could be chosen at any point in time to perform  a comprehen-
sive review of  another large firm,  it is not beyond the realm of  possibility that 
negative review findings  can be suppressed by members of  the review team for 
fear  of  retribution by the firm  under review since it too will someday serve in 
the capacity of  reviewer. Beyond self-interest  issues, peer review teams may be 
motivated to stifle  findings  of  egregious audit error to maintain the illusion that 
everything is "ok" in the auditing profession  today, thus ensuring the continua-
tion of  a system of  self-governance. 
Because client engagements are never selected randomly by the peer review 
team, their findings  may not be representative of  the entire population of  audits 
completed by the firm  under review. In addition, the review is often  limited to 
workpaper evidence, thus making it virtually impossible to gauge source credi-
bility or to detect people-related problems that may have caused audit quality 
reduction on the job, such as premature sign-off  or shirking on audit tasks. In 
essence, given these problems, and because the purpose of  a peer review is 
remedial rather than punitive, this form  of  self-regulation  may do very little to 
mitigate substandard audit work. For similar reasons, QCIC investigations may 
not lessen audit failure  because the QCIC operates under a veil of  total secrecy 
and does not have the authority to apply disciplinary measures, even to audit 
firms  or individuals who knowingly engaged in deceptive or fraudulent  activi-
ties [Mautz and Evers 1991, pp. 48-49]. 
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Will the Going Concern Audit Opinion and Management 
Reports on Internal Control Expose Auditors to Increased 
Litigation Risk? 
Sullivan's analysis of  QCIC cases involving fifty  non-financial  business 
firms  revealed that for  sixteen companies going bankrupt, only five  firms 
received SAS 59 [ AICPA, 1988] audit report modifications.  In addition, seven 
of  the remaining thirty-four  non-bankrupt companies also received a going con-
cern audit report modification.  Perhaps one reason for  auditors' difficulty  in 
issuing a modified  audit report, as noted by Elliott and Jacobson [1987], is that 
the issuance of  a going concern opinion itself  may serve as a self-fulfilling 
prophecy for  failure.  A second reason may be that the notion of  substantial 
doubt about the client organization's ability to continue operations as required 
by SAS 59 is not well defined  in the accounting or auditing literatures 
[Ellingsen, Pany and Fagan, 1989], thus causing ambiguity and possible error in 
auditors' going concern judgments [Solomon and Krogstad 1988]. Although 
auditors are not and have never been responsible for  forecasting  future  events, 
many believe that audit report modifications  for  going concern may be a prime 
source of  present and future  litigation for  public accounting firms.  On the other 
hand, Sullivan found  only three legal actions in his QCIC sample of  ninety 
firms  pertaining to an alleged failure  to provide a "red flag"  for  a company's 
insolvency. 
The relatively low bankruptcy prediction rate suggested by Sullivan's analy-
sis may indicate that the requirements brought about by SAS 59 are nearly 
impossible to attain. These same findings,  however, may have resulted from  the 
auditor's inability to accurately frame  predictions of  the client's financial  dis-
tress caused, in part, by ineffective  auditing procedures that do not consider 
important factors  within and outside the client organization. For example, based 
on the theory of  organizational decline, Ponemon and Schick [1991] found  that 
six qualitative factors  explain actual going concern problems in client organiza-
tions. In short, using these factors  in concert with financial  indicators, Ponemon 
and Schick [1991] suggest that auditors may be better able to frame  reliable pre-
dictive judgments of  client organizations and their managements.3 
The low incidence of  legal action caused by failure  to modify  an audit report 
for  continued existence may indicate that the additional paragraph required by 
SAS 59 may be of  little consequence to security holders and their attorneys 
when filing  suit against a firm.  Drawing from  Sullivan's reported findings,  how-
ever, I believe that a very different  story can be presented. As illustrated by the 
author's Table four,  eighty-six of  ninety QCIC cases of  alleged audit failure 
examined by Sullivan related to organizations that were either bankrupt or had 
experienced severe decline in earnings. One could reasonably conclude that 
allegations of  audit failure  and resulting litigations were greatly influenced  by 
the auditor's inability to predict the client's impending bankruptcy or financial 
distress. The complaint, as drafted  by lawyers, however, may be grounded on 
3 In a recent study by Schick and Ponemon [1993], auditor's assessments of  audit risk were related 
to their perceptions of  a client's rate of  growth or decline. Here auditors perceived the most risky 
clients as those that were experiencing very rapid growth or very rapid decline. These findings  may 
suggest that auditors are tacitly incorporating their perceptions of  organizational decline in their 
assessment of  the client organization's financial  well-being. 
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other related facts  that the plaintiff's  attorney believes will stand a greater 
chance of  being proven in court or that will generate a larger settlement sum. In 
other words, given Sullivan's data, it may be nearly impossible to assess the 
extent to which proper assessment of  going concern problems by the auditor 
would have mitigated a wide array of  litigation claims against audit firms. 
Furthermore, Palmrose [1991] found  that the auditor's inability to predict a 
client's impending financial  distress may have a profoundly  negative impact on 
the reputation of  an audit firm  because such allegations of  audit failure  are more 
likely than other incidents to be reported by the financial  press. 
According to Sullivan, a second area of  potential future  litigation risk con-
cerns the draft  report entitled Internal  Report— Integrated  Framework  pub-
lished in 1992 by the Committee on Sponsoring Organizations of  the Treadway 
Commission (COSO). The COSO report deals with management's role in eval-
uating and reporting on the adequacy of  internal controls within the orga-
nizational setting. The report states (p. 8) that ethical values, integrity and com-
petence of  management are essential components to a well-functioning  system 
of  internal control. While these qualities are impossible to assess, and because a 
company's management would rarely disclose ethical problems to the public, it 
is possible that uncorroborated assertions about internal controls will be report-
ed by management. If,  however, internal control problems related to incompe-
tent or low integrity management are revealed to the public after  the fact,  audi-
tors may find  themselves victims of  lawsuits alleging that they failed  to proper-
ly consider management assertions about internal controls. 
While the report does not expressly require independent verification  of  man-
agement's reports on internal control, Sullivan intimates that a potential by-
product of  COSO recommendations when implemented may be increased litiga-
tion for  auditing firms.  Again I disagree with Sullivan's prediction because, if 
implemented properly, the COSO recommendations are intended to reduce inci-
dents of  undetected material weaknesses in an organization's internal control 
system. These improvements, in turn, should result in a commensurate re-
duction in lawsuits based on the auditor's failure  to detect or report on internal 
control problems. To corroborate my point, consider Sullivan's analysis of 
QCIC cases in which fifty-one  of  ninety allegations of  audit failure  involved 
internal control related problems in client organizations. 
Increasing malpractice litigation against audit firms  may be a sign that the 
public is demanding more from  the profession.  It appears that the so-called 
"expectations gap" between financial  statement users and auditors may be 
widening. Many auditing practitioners and researchers alike argue that the com-
plexity of  client organizations and the extent of  competition in the auditing ser-
vices market make it increasingly difficult  to render quality audit services at a 
reasonable price. Perhaps user demands for  attestation services beyond a level 
of  reasonable assurance make it imperative that independent audits be treated as 
public goods. While litigation is a form  of  social control over the profession,  if 
it has become needlessly excessive or abusive, efforts  to minimize legal expo-
sure are most definitely  warranted.4 On the other hand, however, increasing liti-
4 Robert Mednick [1987], partner of  Arthur Andersen & Co., makes a cogent argument for  tort 
reform.  He claims that limiting joint and several liability and restoring the privity standard should 
be the two top priorities of  the auditor litigation reform  efforts. 
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gation may well be indicative of  a reduction in the public trust, in which case 
other forms  of  social control may be necessary. 
At the risk of  opening a Pandora's box, in conclusion allow me to suggest 
that some sort of  external regulation may be the only solution acceptable to an 
increasingly mistrustful  public. In this respect, accountants are likely to be 
joined shortly by their counterparts in the legal and medical professions.  If  this 
is not acceptable, then attention must be paid to the real-world needs and con-
cerns of  the general public instead of  investing time and effort  in the protection 
of  "turf."  Self-regulation  can only work if  everyone affected,  rather than merely 
those being regulated, agrees that it is working and is satisfied  with the outcome 
of  the process. 
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